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 ADVISORY OPINIONS IN INDIA
 William D. Popkinť
 In a previous article*," Prematurity and Obiter Dictum in Indian
 Judicial Thought'', we examined the dangers of premature judicial
 decision. Two main problems emerged ; the inadequate development
 of the facts in the light of which a case must be decided, and the
 intrusion by the judiciary into areas where private or political solu-
 tions might be more acceptable. The institution of " Advisory Opi-
 nions " presents these same problems and we now turn to a close
 examination of that institution in India.
 I. INTRODUCTION
 The standard criticism of an advisory opinion has been given
 in the Canadian case, Attorney-General for Ontario v. Hamilton Street Ry.:1
 " They are questions proper to be considered in concrete cases
 only, and opinions expressed upon the operation of the sections
 referred to, and the extent to which they are applicable, would
 be worthless for many reasons. They would be worthless as being
 speculative opinions on hypothetical questions. It would be con-
 trary to principle, inconvenient, and inexpedient that opinions
 should be given upon such questions at all. When they arise, they
 must arise in concrete cases, involving private rights; and it
 would bę extremely unwise for any judicial tribunal to attempt
 beforehand to exhaust all possible cases and facts which might
 occur to qualify, cut down, and override the operation of parti-
 cular words when the concrete case is not before us."
 As long as advisory opinions develop by analogy to opinions
 given by a lawyer to a client this criticism is likely to have great
 force. For it is normally the function of the lawyer to give advice
 in advance of concrete factual developments. The lawyer must then
 exhaust all possible situations in anticipation of some actual dispute or
 deal in a hypothetical way with some abstract proposition of law
 which it is feared may become applicable to his client's activities.
 t LL.B. (Harvard) Fulbright Scholar, Indian Law Institute, New Delhi, 1961 -'62.
 * Vol. IV* No. 2 (April-June 1962) of this journal.
 I. [1903] A.C. 524, 529.
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 However, the development by analogy to a lawyer's advice is not
 an intrinsic trait of this institution.2 The hypothetical nature of the
 problem presented to the court is not inevitable. A hypothetical or
 premature question can be presented to the Court for an advisory
 opinion in two ways. First, there may actually be a mature and
 concrete controversy prompting the reference but the question put
 will be stated in the hypothetical manner usually characteristic of pre-
 mature controversies3. Secondly, the fact situation may not be matured
 with the result that the counsel inadequately understand their case
 and the judges are unable to write concrete statements of the law.
 Writers often speak as though the abstraction of the legal issues
 is essential in an advisory opinion 4 or make it the foundation of their
 criticism.5 But there is no reason to suppose that the government
 must abstract a legal question from a concrete situation or that the
 reference will deal with premature fact situations. Indeed, this insti-
 tution may develop so as to approximate closely a system of decla-
 ratory judgments dealing with concrete cases, rather than in the
 practice of legal advice to a client.6
 India has had a specific provision for advisory opinions since
 1937.7 Under the Government of India Act, 1935, four opinions
 were given : In re C. P. Motor Spirit Act ; In re Hindu Women's Right to
 Property Act ; In the Matter of the Allocation of Lands and Buildings ; In re
 Levy of Estate Duty.8 And under the 1950 Constitution, three opinions
 2. Article 76 (2 ) of the Constitution of India already makes it lhe duty of the
 Attorney-General to give legal advice to the government.
 3. The practice of the International Court of Justice with advisory opinions has
 sometimes been to insist on such abstraction : Judgment of the Administrative Tribunal of
 the International Labour Organization [1956] I.C.J. Rep. 77, 158-59 ; Interpretation of Peace
 Treaties with Bulgaria , Hungary & Rumania [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65, 84 ; Competence of the
 General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the U.N. [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 7 ;
 Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the U.N. [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, 61.
 4. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d Ed. 1941) p. 73 ; see also Judgment of the
 Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization [1956] I.C.J. Rep. 77,
 158-59.
 5. Frankfurter, "A Note on Advisory Opinions", 37 Hary.L . Rev. 1002 (1924).
 6. Allen, 'Administrative Consultation of the Judiciary", 47 L. Q. Rev. 43, 55
 (1931) (if concrete facts involved, situation is not like the usual advisory opinion);
 Hart & Wechsler, Federal Courts and the Federal System (1953) p. 81 (advisory opinions of
 the old World Court are more like declaratory judgments since actual disputes and
 adverse parties are involved).
 7. Government of India Act, 1935, sec. 213 (becoming effective in 1937).
 8. A.I.R. 1939 F.C. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the Central Provinces case)
 A.I.R. 1941 F.C. 72 (hereinafter referred to as the Hindu Women's case) ; A.I.R. 1943
 F.C. 13 (hereinafter referred to as the Allocation case) ; A.I.R. 1944 F.C. 73 (here-
 inafter referred to as the Levy case).
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 have been rendered : In re Ďelhi Laws Act ; In re Kerala Education Bill 1957 ;
 In re Indo- Pakistan Agreement relating to Berubari Union and Exchange
 of Enclaves. 9 It is the purpose of this article to examine the Indian
 experience with this institution to see the extent to which the dangers
 of prematurity have been avoided and to see what other disadvantages
 may be attendant upon such a practice. While the dominant theme
 of this critique will be to point out certain risks, he has no intention
 of reaching a negative conclusion. The purpose is only to suggest
 possible dangers and compensating advantages so that thought will be
 stimulated among those better able to reach a £nal evaluation.
 II. HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS
 There-is no doubt that the Federal Court and the Supreme Court
 have always attempted to assimilate the court procedures in an advisory
 opinion to those of the usual adversary proceeding. This reduces the
 danger of hypothetically phrased questions remaining in their
 abstract state, provided that the situation prompting the reference to
 the Court is a concrete dispute. The 1950 Constitution, as well as the
 1935 Act, required opinions to be given in open court, 10 which en-
 courages the care and deliberation that comes when public scrutiny
 follows. The Supreme Court rules provide that the procedure appro-
 priate to the Court's original jurisdiction shall be followed where
 possible in a reference under Article 143. 11 Under the Government
 of India Act cases, the Court always saw to it that interested parties
 were represented.12 There can be no doubt that the procedures of
 the Court will make a reference as close to a normal adversary case as
 is possible.13
 The intention to assimilate the advisory jurisdiction to the status
 of the normal adversary jurisdiction is also reflected in the widespread
 9. A.I.R. 1951 S.G. 332 (hereinafter referred to as the Delhi Laws Act case);
 A.I.R. 1958 S.G. 956 (hereinafter referred to as the Kerala case) ; A.I.R. 1960 S.G. 845
 (hereinafter referred to as the Berubari case).
 10. Government of India Act, 1935, sec. 213 (2) ; Article 145(4) of the Constitu-
 tion of India.
 11. Supreme Court Rules, 1950, Part V, Rules 1-5.
 12. Hindu Women's case, p. 73 (notify Advocates-General of Provinces though no
 notice to any other parties) ; Central Provinces case, p. 3 (notify other provinces in view
 of their contingent interest) ; Levy case, p. 74 (Government of India and Provinces
 notified and amicus brief for taxpayers required) ; In the Allocation case, the center
 and Punjab appeared as the most directly interested parties.
 13. However, it should be noted that the International Court of Justice has
 retreated from its earlier strict requirements of adversary proceedings in an advisory
 opinion; see Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania 1950
 I.C.J. Rep. 65, where the Court gave an opinion despite the unwillingness of a party
 to appear.
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 treatment of advisory opinions as binding precedent with full stare
 decisis effect, 14 and the invariable compliance with the opinion by
 political bodies 15. It is often said that advisory opinions are not
 legally binding.16. However, as long as the procedures are chara-
 cteristic of the normal case, a primary reason for withholding stare
 decisis effect is removed ; for if the parties vitally interested in the
 outcome of the litigation participate adversely, subsequent litigants
 lose one basis for objecting to the application of the law established
 in that case to themselves. Further evidence that such opinions were
 meant to be as authoritative as normal judgments is in the provision
 in the Constitution for five judges to sit out of the eight originally
 required by the Constitution to be on the Court.17
 While the use of adversary procedures and the giving of opinions
 in open Court can go a long way in concretizing abstractly phrased
 questions, no procedures can concretise a genuinely premature case.
 There the danger of abstractness lies in the lack of concrete facts,
 not in the phraseology of the question or the lack of adversary pro-
 cedures. The safety valve for such situations remains the rule that
 advisory opinions are not binding as well as the rule that the Court
 has discretion to refuse to give an opinion in most situations.18
 14. K . K. Chatter jee v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. 30 of 1960 (21-4-60)
 (dismissed because the issues were covered by the Berubari opinion) ; State v. R. Tiwari
 A.I.R. 1956 Patna 188, 190 ( Delhi Laws Act case followed) ; Kadhi Bewa v. Bhagawan
 Sahu A.I.R. 1951 Orissa 378, 396 (Hindu Women' s case the highest authority on the
 subject) ; Emperor v. Munnal Lai A.I.R. 1942 All. 156, 168 (duty to follow Centrai
 Provinces case).
 15. After the Levy case no estate duty was enacted. The British Parliament felt
 it necessary to amend the Government of India Act, 1935 (see Statutes, 1945, Gh. 7,
 p. 54) and the 1950 Indian Constitution also included a special provision for an
 estate duty (List I, No. 87 of Schedule 7).
 Following the Kerala decision, the state amended the bill to conform to the Court's
 opinion; Moothedam, The Kerala Education Act, 1958, and Minority Schools , 1959
 Ker. L.T. 55.
 16. See e.g. Kerala case, p. 964.
 17. Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India. It was even the intention of the
 framers that a full bench sit ; Report of the Committees to the Constituent Assembly (First
 Series) 1947, Dec., 1946 - July, 1947, p. 64, dated July 4, 1947. Seven judges sat in
 the Delhi Laws Act and Kerala cases, eight in the Berubari reference.
 18. Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India says that the Court "may"
 report its opinion. It is only in the special case of certain treaties under Article 143(2)
 that the Court ''shall" report to the President. The Constitutional Convention was
 clear that e'may" was intended to be permissive, "shall" compulsory ; Constituent
 Assembly Debates , Vol. VIII, May 16- June 16, 1949, p. 387. The Kerala case
 supports this view, p. 964-
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 Advisory opinions will have the stare decisis effect to which they are
 entitled in the light of their compliance with the accepted norms
 embodied in the doctrine of prematurity.19
 The Federal Court on one occasion denied the stare decisis effect
 of an advisory opinion and completely reviewed the rationale of its
 prior opinion.20 It is interesting that the legal issue reviewed suffer-
 ed from serious defects of prematurity in the case in which it origi-
 nally arose, the Hindu Women's case. In that advisory opinion the
 Court even conceded that there was as yet no " opposite party " to
 the legal contentions raised by the government in the reference. The
 Court did see to it that the provinces were represented. This assured
 a vigorous argument against the encroachment of the center upon
 the provincial sphere of agricultural property. But the provinces did
 not care at all about the total invalidity of the statute.21 No dispute
 on this point had yet developed. Nonetheless, the question of total
 invalidity was raised. The bill had been considered by one house
 of the Parliament before the implementation of the Government of
 India Act and by another house after that Act became effective. The
 Court found that this did not disqualify it from becoming law. In
 the Umayal Achi case, supra , however, the litigants were genuinely
 concerced with this issue of total invalidity and the opinions of the
 judges reflect the difference. Each judicial statement is far more
 carefully worked out and each argument more fully weighed.
 Using this test of a mature controversy as the basis for the
 binding effect of an advisory opinion, we find one other opinion
 seriously defective, the levy case. Here the issue was the central
 government's right to legislate an estate tax as opposed to an in-
 heritance tax. No bill had been drafted in the legislature. The bill
 which the Court considered was the one which the parties agreed on,
 not one which the legislature had passed or even considered. 22 It is
 difficult to find a more hypothetical question ; the Court was being
 used simply as a government lawyer. No adversary atmosphere could
 19. Res adjudicata effect is also denied. This rule, if it were applicable, would
 bar only those who participated in the case and their privies from raising the issues in
 another litigation. However, since the parties did not choose the issues and did not
 initiate the suit, this rule should not apply as long as the absence of stare decisis effect
 allows the rest of the world to challenge the opinion.
 20. Uttioyal Achí v. Lakshmi Achí A.i.ix. iy±o r.Ct. zo.
 21. Hindu Women's case, 1941 F.G R. Vol. 111. p. 19 (argument of counsel).
 22. Levy case, p. 77 ; the Governor-ueneral expressly ínviteü an opinion on the
 assumption that the bill was the same as the English statute.
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 be generated since the parties before the Court were not directly
 involved as adversaries in an imminent controversy. The proof of
 this lies in the concession by the taxpayer's representative, who had
 been appointed by the government, of the right of the government
 to tax.23 No taxpayer could feel that his interests were adequately
 represented when such a concession is made.
 The Court said that this case was not hypothetical since the
 Governor-General was seriously considering giving the central govern-
 ment the power to impose estate duties if the Court found that the
 legislature lacked such power at present. This completely misunder-
 stands the function of the doctrine of prematurity. Alegai issue is
 not made less hypothetical because there is intense concern about it.
 Where that concern springs from the imminence of an act which
 does not make the legal issues any more concrete, the problem re-
 mains hypothetical. Here the supposed imminence was with regard
 to the Governor-General's granting a power to the central govern-
 ment, not with regard to the passage oí the bill and the levying of a
 tax, which alone might have made a question about the law concrete.
 By contrast with the lack of adversary proceedings in the Hindu
 Women's and Levy cases, we may compare the Allocation reference.
 There the government's problem was much like that of a private land-
 owner whose title is challenged at a time when he hopes to use the
 land. This case closely parallels a declaratory judgment to remove
 a cloud on title to realty. It is very strange, therefore, that the Court
 picked this case in which to voice its misgivings about the non-binding
 effect of an advisory opinion.24 This was the strongest case from that
 point of view.
 The inadequate fact development in the Hindu Women's and Levy
 cases resulted in an inability to have fully developed adversary
 proceedings. This is the most extreme defect of a premature fact
 situation. More frequently, prematurity results in the inadequate
 understanding of the immediate impact of a challenged piece of
 legislation, though an adversary presentation is possible. In the
 Kerala case, the Court heard the reference before the rules had been
 promulgated under the statute. The threatened impact of a take-over
 of schools in that state was enough to ensure a very adversary
 proceeding. Nonetheless, an understanding of the full impact of such
 23. Levy case, p. 76.
 24. Allocation case, p. 15; seer Vol. 1, p. 15. "Executive Consultation of the
 Judiciary with Special Reference to India" Trivandrum Law College Journal ,
 March, 1955, Vol. 1, p. 15.
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 a take-over in all its details was lost to the Court as long as it did not
 have the rules before it.25 The lack of any administrative practice
 under the Kerala Education Bill meant a similar def ect in understand-
 ing the immediate context in which the legal issue arose. Both rules
 and administrative practice may better reveal how a statute immedia-
 tely effects individuals.
 In the Central Provinces case we see a different type of factual
 deficiency from that so far discussed. The facts in that case were
 sufficiently developed to assure an adversary presentation by the
 parties ; the bill was ready to be brought into effect but for the
 Court's decision.26 And the immediate impact of the central govern-
 ment's removal of the state's power to tax sales to consumers was
 reasonably clear without administrative practice ; for, unlike the
 take-over of schools in the Kerala case, the immediate impact of a loss
 of revenue can be easily translated into meaningful quantitative terms.
 However, it is possible that greater long-term historical experience
 with the relationship between state and center concerning sales taxes
 and other revenue matters would have been of great assistance in
 determining the constitutional and legal resolution of this dispute.
 Practice can be an excellent guide to the proper solution of consti-
 tutional questions,27 and the Court forfeited this by deciding the
 reference at an early stage of constitutional development.
 The Delhi Laws Act case presented a similar problem. An adver-
 sary proceeding and an understanding of the immediate impact of the
 challenged legislation was assured ; the very issue before the Court
 had been presented two years earlier to the Federal Court in a
 25. State of Bombay v. United Motors Ltd. A.I.R. 1953 S.G. 252, 262 (rules used to
 interpret statute; the fact that rules passed simultaneously with the statute is
 irrelevant, Bose, J. at p. 268-69).
 cf. Levy case, p. 77 where it was admitted that the machinery sections of a statute
 may be useful in understanding the charging sections.
 26. Hindustan Times, April 28, 1938, p. 14, col. 6.
 27. In McCulloch v. Maryland 4 L.Ed. 579, 602 (1819), Marshall, J. stated this
 view in the expression, it is a ''constitution we are expounding.'' In that very case#
 Daniel Webster, as counsel, had stressed the long-standing acceptance by both the
 legislature and the executive as evidence of its constitutionality (p. 581).
 In the Central Provinces case, however, the Court expressed doubt concerning the
 value of actual practice ; p. 37. Especially was this thought to be true when the
 document being interpreted was a new one, differing radically from prior basic law.
 However, the very youth of the document urges awaiting further experience before
 ąttempting to interpret it.
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 concrete case.28 But, like the Central Provinces case, it came at the very
 beginning of the experience under the document to be interpreted.
 The doctrine of " delegation of legislative power ", at issue in this
 case, is one that the experience of history can greatly clarify. The
 vacillation of U.S. courts on this question, and the working out of a
 legal solution by careful case by case development, suggest the impor-
 tance of such experience.29
 Furthermore, the lack of administrative practice over a period of
 time in the Kerala case not only deprived the Court of an understand-
 ing of the immediate impact of the legislation ; it also meant that the
 broader social background in the light of which the constitutional
 issues had to be determined was unknown.
 The assumption behind the view suggested here is directly
 contrary to the approach which maintains that words of a statute or a
 constitution "mean what they say." Gold, hard facts, discovered
 through practice, may shed light upon the legal solution which judges
 and lawyers could never have anticipated.30 A deficiency of such
 historical facts may thwart a proper resolution of the legal problems
 arising out of an otherwise concrete and mature case. The idea
 expressed is that the immediate impact of a statute may be known,
 but the long term legal significance and interpretation of the statute or
 relevant Article of the Constitution remain uncertain. The termino-
 logy often used by U.S. legal writers to denote the distinction between
 facts required to illumine the immediate impact of a legal rule and
 those required to help interpret a legal rule is adjudicative facts for
 the former and legislative or historical facts for the latter.31
 Nor should the phrase "legislative facts " make courts wary of
 intrusion upon legislative functions. Judicial awareness of basic social
 trends is crucial and is not a usurpation of the political functioning of
 the legislature.
 Whenever either type of factual development is inadequate, an
 advisory opinion should be considered less trustworthy and its stare
 28. Jatindra Nath v. Province of Bihar A.I.R. 1949 F.G. 175; the Delhi Laws Act
 case admittedly (p. 338) involved a re-examination of this case.
 29. See the remarks of Bose, J. in Delhi Laws Act case, p. 437 (even American
 judges departed from their old rigid view of delegation under the pressure of the
 circumstances) ; p. 439 (this question must be left to case by case development).
 30. Frankfurter, " A note on Advisory Opinions 37 Harv. L. Rev . 1002, 1005-06
 (1924).
 31 . See 44 Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statutes", 69 Harv. L. Reo,
 1302, 1311 (1956).
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 decisis effect limited ; although the lack of adjudicative facts is more
 serious because it prevents an understanding of whatever legislative or
 historical facts are available at the stage of history at which the case
 arises.
 Furthermore, the inadequacy of legislative facts may be considered
 as a factor in refusing to give an advisory opinion, even though this
 could not be independently significant in deciding the narrower issue
 of prematurity. For a case will not be premature if the immediate
 impact of the relevant legal rule is apparent, however inadequate the
 historical experience with that legal rule may be. The most weight
 that the lack of historical experience can carry in a normal adversary
 litigation is to re-enforce a decision that other elements of prematurity
 warrant a denial of a judicial pronouncement. However, in an
 advisory reference the discretion to refuse an opinion, as well as the
 power to grant a hearing,32 is broader than in the normal adversary
 litigation. Any lack of historical experience may, therefore, legiti-
 mately be considered as an independent factor in deciding whether or
 not to render an opinion.
 It may be said that the possibility of challenging a bill immediately
 after it becomes a statute makes our suggestion of the importance of
 legislative facts untenable. Apart from over-looking the benefit of
 the rules which come after passage, this argument begs the question.
 Why may it be challenged after passage ? Has anyone been hurt ? Has
 its application been threatened ? All the questions of prematurity, i.e.,
 the development of adjudicative facts, which we belaboured in the
 prior article recur.
 The Delhi Laws Act case revealed another danger which is normally
 associated with prematurity, but which did not spring from such a
 defect in this case. Just as abstractness may result from the manner
 in which a legal question is phrased despite the maturity of the facts,33
 so the atmosphere in a reference may prove conducive to the abstract
 treatment of the question referred. This may be so although the
 concrete facts are present, the procedures are the same as in a normal
 case, and the legal question is concretely put to the Court. In the
 Delhi Laws Act case, the question presented to the Court was treated as
 32. The phrase "likely to arise" in Article 143(1) allows pending legislation to
 be examined in an advisory opinion [Kerala case, p. 964 ; Levy case, p. (75), although
 this is not allowed in normal litigation ; Bhairabendra v. State of Assam A.I.R. 1953
 Assam 162.
 33. See fn. 3 and accompanying text.
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 opening up the entire issue of legislative delegation of power.34
 However, the concrete question before the Court was the narrow one
 of delegation of legislating power in small areas where independent
 legislative machinery was impractical and expensive, rather than the
 usual one of a rule-making power to implement social welfare legisla-
 tion. Only one justice noted the narrower implication of this
 question.35 The rest filled over one hundred pages with a resulting
 abstraction which proved confusing in subsequent cases.36 It may be
 that this tendency to dilate was due to an atmosphere generated in a
 reference proceeding, much as lawyers may sit around an office
 exhausting all the ramifications of a legal issue before venturing to
 advise a client.37
 This tendency to abstraction in an advisory opinion even when
 the reference is based on a concrete situation, can be seen in the
 practice of the International Court of Justice. There the abstraction
 does not occur at the stage of oral argument by counsel, as it did in
 the Delhi Laws Act case, but at the earlier stage of the framing of the
 question put to the Court. The issues must be abstracted from the
 underlying concrete fact situation,38 although this view is not without
 its dissenters.39 The feeling is that an opinion on a question of law is
 different from a settlement of a dispute. The former is abstract, the
 latter concrete. Such a view is directly contrary to what we would
 assert to be a question of law, i.e., the application of general rules to
 concrete fact situations, arising in an actual dispute. However, this
 34. This development is not a necessary one ; see Central Provinces case, p. 3
 ("question lies in a small compass") ; and Kerala case, p. 992 (because this is an
 advisory opinion, the reference should be narrowly construed;.
 The concern with the tendency to write rambling essays is behind the recommen-
 dation in 69 Haw . L. Rev. 1302, 1312 that the maitrix case should always be made
 apparent.
 35. Delhi Laws Act case, Bose, J., pp. 434-35.
 36. Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 123, 126 (difficult
 to find a definite principle of use in other cases from the Delhi Laws Act opinions) ;
 Ziaullah Khan v. State ofUttar Pradesh A.I.R. 1955 All. 554, 557 (the language of the
 Delhi Laws Act case allows delegation of repeal powers even though that case held
 otherwise).
 37. The taxpayer's concession in the Levy case (see fn. 23) may have sprung from
 the "friendly" atmosphere of a reference proceeding.
 38. See fn. 3.
 39. Reservation to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide [1951]
 I.C.J. Rep. 15, 31 (though the question is abstract it will be more realistic to state the
 facts) ; Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the U.N. [1950]
 I.G.J. Rep. 4, 22; Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the U.N. [1948J
 I.C.J. Rep. 57, 107.
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 dichotomy has been maintained by the International Court and there
 is a danger that the tendency towards abstraction exerts a strong pull
 in advisory opinions.40
 There is a further risk in advisory opinions, usually associated
 with a premature case, but which here arises from the manner in
 which a reference originates and not from the existence of a premature
 fact situation. A premature case may raise as the central issue what
 is really a tangential issue frprn the point of view of future litigation.
 Attention will be incorrectly focussed because the full implications of
 the legal issues are not understood. In an advisory opinion the
 " wrong issue " may be raised for another reason; the government may
 be interested in something which does not seriously concern the prospec-
 tive litigants. This can happen because there is no requirement that
 the government be the party most interested in litigating the issues
 raised by the reference proceeding which it initiates.41 Legally, this
 danger is not great. Any issue not discussed in court cannot be
 precluded in a later case even if the advisory opinion were to have
 full stare decisis effect. This is due to the inapplicability of the rule
 of res adjudicata. However, the psychological effect may be staggering.
 In the Kerala case, the most prospective petitioner was not the central
 government, but the institutions of learning which feared control by
 the state.42 These parties felt that the main constitutional questions
 were not the points raised by the government.43
 The Court refused to consider the objections raised by the parties
 since it was held that the President's interest in making the reference
 limited the scope of inquiry. But in upholding the statute, the Court
 40. See fn. 13 on the International Court's retreat from a prior strict adherence
 to adversary procedures in advisory opinions.
 41. It has been suggested, therefore, that an advisory opinion be given only when
 the government asking the question is concerned with the legality of its own action ;
 "Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statutes", 69 Harv. L. Rev, 1302,
 1307-08 (1956).
 42. It is true that the central government was required to take " action in the
 form of Presidential approval of this bill which had been reserved by the Governor for
 his assent (Article 200 of the Constitution). But the requirement that the referring
 government's own action be involved in the reference is designed to make it a natural
 litigant in the proceeding. This is possible only if it is directly a^ected by the chai-
 lenged bill or if it is the source of the legislation, neither of which is true as a result of
 Presidential assent.
 43. Kerala case, p. 965 ; Article 19(1 )(g) (freedom to practice any profession or
 to carry on any occupation, trade or business) was urged on the Court, and it seems
 that Article 30(2) (no discrimination in monetary aid to educational institutions
 against religious minority) was also of great impor tenance.
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 solidified public opinion around the belief that certain parts of it were
 valid as against all constitutional objections. Thus the psychological
 effect as well as the time and expense of further litigation discourage
 any future testing of this statute.
 III. Judicial Intrusion in Political Affairs
 The dangers we have so far discussed have all involved the
 problems of abstractness. There is, however, a second area of risk,
 broadly characterized as the intrusion of the courts into private and
 political affairs. We have already seen one aspect of this intrusion in
 situations where historical or legislative facts could have been of use in
 formulating legal rules. This was just another way of saying that the
 process of experience might offer solutions which were better than the
 accelerated judicial deliberation of a court. However, the more
 specific meaning of the injunction against judicial intrusion envisions
 the utility of specific institutional settlements of nascent disputes such
 as a contractual or political bargain, rather than the general advan-
 tages of historical experience.
 With advisory opinions in India, this danger is most likely to take
 the form of totally by-passing the political arena. The phrase
 " likely to arise ", which characterizes one type of question on which
 an opinion may be given, has been interpreted to allow pending
 legislation to come before the Court in a reference proceeding;
 although a pending bill cannot be challenged in a normal adversary
 proceeding. When pending legislation is examined judicially we lose
 the benefit of a political judgment on the social needs which prompted
 the legislation, i.e., on the legislative or historical facts which must
 contribute to the judicial solution of the problem.44 Nor can such
 political judgment be ignored, in its larger sense of an expression of
 the basic desires of the people, without running the risk of unnaturally
 isolating legal decisions from the deeper social and political trends of
 the society.45 The law does not lie on one side of a rigid line on
 the other side of which resides the political and private sector.
 When a political judgment is by-passed we also run the risk of
 embracing difficult and controversial questions, although it may
 44. Frankfurter, " A Note on Advisory Opinions 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1002, 1005
 (1924).
 45. The weight of this assertion is not as great in India as in the United States.
 The procedure for amendment of the Indian Constitution is simple (Art. 368) Com-
 pared to^thejstricttr requirements of the U.S. Constitution. It can be argued that the
 basic desires of the people in India have a relatively easy outlet if constitutional
 change is desired so that courts need not be too solicitous of this factor,
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 never be necessary to do so if the legislature fails to pass the bill.
 The presentation of a draft bill does not really cure this defect. At
 best it is some evidence of the seriousness of the party in power to
 realize its legislative aims.
 One of the reasons given by the Calcutta High Court in Nirmal
 Bose v. Union of India 46 for refusing to decide the case at present seems
 to be based upon an awareness of the dangers of decision when the
 political process is incomplete. Here the incompleteness was not
 legislative, for a bill was not challenged ; it was rather the uncertainty
 of executive action. The Court refused judicial relief for a claim that
 the executive department was acting unconstitutionally, because no
 definite decision to take action without consulting the legislature had
 been taken and no orders to the State of West Bengal to implement
 any decision had been issued. The court noted the political content
 of the arguments made to the Bench,47 which may have resulted from
 the lack of any final political judgment having been brought to bear
 on the subject.48 And yet this very volatile issúe was referred to the
 Supreme Court in the Beruh ari case for an advisory opinion, though
 the same elements of prematurity persisted.
 A danger closely related to that of by-passing political judgment
 is the lessening of legislative or executive responsibility for the cons-
 titutionality of its own decisions because it may feel free to consult the
 judiciary where such doubts arise.49 We are assuming that the real
 strength of a constitution must lie in the responsibility of the citizens
 and their elected representatives, however useful judicial vigilance may
 be. In India, however, there is every evidence that the legislature and
 executive still consider themselves separately responsible for the cons-
 titutionality of their own decisions ; for the Attorney-General has the
 right to address the Parliament and his advice has been accepted.50
 46. A.I.R. 1959 Gal. 506.
 47. Id. at p. 519.
 48. In the Central Provinces case, only a bill was presented for an advisory
 opinion ; but it appears that the the process of political judgment had stopped. The
 bill awaited only a notification which was itself dependent only upon the Court's
 decision ; Hindustan Times, April 28, 1938, p. 14, col. 6. However, one can never be
 too sure what political factors may arise despite the conviction that only a Court's
 decision is relevant.
 49. Frankfurter, "A note on Advisory Opinions", 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1002, 1007
 (1924).
 50. Under Article 88 of the Constitution of India, the Attorney-General has the
 right to address Parliąment. The government accepted his advice that a law passed
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 One reason why this danger is not pressing lies in the present
 limited use of advisory opinions. The attitude among most people to-
 wards advisory opinions is one of approval if they are not used too
 often. This certainly was the intention of the framers of the Cons-
 titution,51 although it is never said why it is good in moderation but
 not if used frequently. It may well be that the fear of converting
 elected officials into petitioners in Court is a primary reason for en-
 couraging a limited use of the reference proceeding.
 The primary risk of advisory opinions in India, however, results
 from judicial involvement in political controversy. We have already
 seen that whenever the activity of a government is examined before its
 action has been finalized, the ebb and flow of political controversy is
 likely to continue to distrub the judicial calm.52 However, there is a
 special danger of such a disturbance in the Indian practice even if the
 governmental action is completed. For the requirement in Article
 143 that the question referred be one of " public import " means that
 the controversy prompting the reference will be contemporary and
 likely to involve much political heat. Of course, the issue in an ad-
 visory opinion may not generate much heated controversy even if it is
 one of " public import ", just as a normal case may frequently be the
 cause of a great political storm. However, the peculiar position of the
 instigating party as the head of the state, taking instructions from the
 political head of the government, makes the practice of giving hot
 political issues to the Court an easy one to develop, and there is evid-
 ence that such a trend is developing in the recent Kerala and Berubari
 references.53
 By "political issues" it is not meant to imply that the questions for the
 Court are political or policy questions. It only means that the atmops-
 here in which the litigation arises is one of heated political controversy.
 by the center banning cow-slaughter would be unconstitutional ; Pari. Debates , 1954,
 Part II, Vol. V., pp. 7997, 8005 and Vol. III-IV, pp. 6235-40.
 The advice of the Law Minister was to be offered for the express purpose of
 affecting votes ; Pari . Debates, 1954, Part II, Vol. I-II, p. 2018.
 51. Report of the Committees to the Constituent Assembly (First Series) 1947, Dec.,
 1946-July, 1947, p. 64, dated July 4, 1947.
 52. Hudson, Advisory Opinions of National and International Courts, 37 Harv ♦
 Ł. Rev. 970; 975 (1924) ; Schwartz, American Constitutional Law (1955) pp. 150-51 (to
 decide the validity of governmental action before it is taken is to act in a "political
 manner ").
 53. The Court in the Kerala case noted its dislike of the extreme heat in counsel's
 arguments, p. 973.
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 Although political heat may be in the background of a normal liti-
 gation, this fact does not dismiss the danger of such a practice in ad-
 visory opinions. The Court's reserve of prestige is not inexhaustible.
 Courts must settle genuine private disputes, however charged the
 atmosphere. This is their job. But this does not mean that it is a
 good idea to encourage dipping into political controversy. The in-
 volvement in legal disputes with a political background is going to
 dissatisfy one of the parties, the one that loses. The greater the pas-
 sions involved, the more likely it is that the displeasure will be vented
 on the Court. The inevitability of this in a normal litigation is no
 argument for providing another forum where it may occur, i.e., a refe-
 rence proceeding. It may be that the limited use of advisory opinions
 is preferred for this reason as well.
 This sense of the danger of involvement in political controversy
 even when a legal and not a political or policy question is involved is
 clearly reflected in the advisory opinion practice of the International
 Court of Justice. It was earlier noted.that the Court leaned towards abs-
 tract questions when " legal questions " arose in an advisory opinion.54
 The context in which the Court made those statements may indicate
 that the judges did not actually consider legal questions to be abstract
 questions, but rather that only by abstraction could the Court avoid
 the political controversy which prompted the reference.05 This mean-
 ing of the word " political " is the sense in which that term is used
 here.
 It is riot suggested that the Indian Supreme Court should deal in
 abstractions. Such decisions are, as has been urged all along, poor
 guides to actions and inadequate solutions of disputes. Furthermore,
 the Court cannot really hope to avoid the heat of the political arena
 by dealing in abstractions,56 any more than the ostrich can effectively
 avoid his enemies by placing his head in the sand. If the situation is
 politically too volatile, that should honestly be considered as a factor
 in deciding whether or not to take the reference.57
 This difficulty of intrusion into politically charged situations is
 more serious than the problems relating to lack of concreteness. For
 54. See fn. 3 and accompanying text.
 55. Admissibility of Hearing of Petitioners by the Committee on S. W. Africa 1956
 I.G.J. Rep. 23, 36-37 (Lauterpacht, J.) .
 56. See cases m in. oy.
 57. Like the lack of legislative facts, volatility may not be an independent reason
 for refusing an otherwise mature case in a normal adversary proceeding. But the
 broader discretion in a reference proceeding allows an open consideration of this
 factor.
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 the latter defect can be cured by a judicious use of stare decisis, while
 the former harm is irreparable.
 The most recent advisory opinion, the Berubari case, affords a good,
 example of the Court's involvement in a political controversy. The
 issue was a purely legal one, "How does the government constitutional-
 ly cede territory if the situation was, in fact, one of cession ? " How-
 ever, this issue was one which had exacerbated public opinion for a
 long time before.58 The real danger in this case becomes apparent
 only if we assume that the opinion had favoured the central govern-
 ment's position and allowed a mere executive order to cede territory,
 instead of a constitutional majority in the legislature. The emotions
 in West Bengal ran very high, and could only have been vented on
 the Court.59 It cannot be said that this is raising imaginary evils.
 Each case can go either way if we assume that the Court is giving an
 impartial judgment on a doubtful legal question.
 The alternative to West Bengal's displeasure is the dissatisfaction
 of the center at an adverse decision. Once again, the potential measure
 of this dissatisfaction is not apparent. Here the center did lose its
 case but it easily controlled the constitutional majority which it needed.
 However, the Court cannot proceed on the assumption that constitu-
 tional decisions will be a rubber-stamp process for the ruling party or,
 more significantly, that the political power to accomplish this will exist
 in the years to come. Time will make the majority in the center a more
 fragile thing and an averse opinion by the Court on a coąstitutional
 question a far more serious matter.60
 The danger discussed above involves the loss of prestige solely on
 account of involvement in a political controversy. This may result
 from the reaction to the Court's opinion. But there is a far more
 serious danger, which is that the public will consider the use of an
 advisory opinion to be a political weapon rather than a source of
 58. Times of India, January 23, 1959, p. 6, col. 7 and April 7, 1959, p. 6, col. 7.
 The Calcutta High Court, hearing the issue which the Supreme Court passed upon in
 the Berubari case in A.I R. 1959 Cal. 506, noted the political content of the arguments
 at p. 519.
 59. See fn. 58 ; even after the opinion required two-thirds of the Parliament to
 approve the executive decision, West Bengal was furious with the center ; Times of
 India, November 26, 1960, p. 1, col. 8 and December 14, 1960, p. 1, col. 2 ; the Court
 would have received this invective if it had found against West Bengal.
 60. It may be that the pressures for a disregard by the political powers of the
 Court's opinion will emerge as a significant danger with this decline of the majority in
 the center, however unlikely this is at present (see fn. 15).
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 resolving legal doubts. In Berubari it appears that the center was moti-
 vated by genuine legal uncertainty ; in fact, West Bengal welcomed
 the reference.61 But in the Kerala case, the situation appeared very
 different. There it looked as though the government made use of an
 advisory opinion to support a position which it was politically unable
 to control. It is not asserted that the government's motives were
 impure. This we cannot know. But the appearances are there and
 they can be equally important when the prestige of the Court is of
 concern.
 In the Kerala case, the political atmosphere was every bit as heated
 as in Berubari ,62 But in addition, the purpose in raising the legal issue
 did not seem to be a genuine concern for the legality of the measure,
 as it had been in Berubari. The legal doubts, however real they may
 have been, seemed injected into the controversy as a means of carry-
 ing on the political struggle. The Kerala State government, whose
 legislation was challenged, was of a different party from the center
 and they opposed the reference.63 They accused the center of dis-
 crimination in not referring other similar measures to the Court and of
 using the advisory opinion for political ends. It looked as though,
 having lost the political battle in the state concerning the passage of
 an education bill, the ruling party in the center tried to win it in the
 Supreme Court.
 It may be objected that the President is expected to pass on the
 constitutionality of state measures when the Governor reserves a bill
 for his assent. But such a practice of reservation should not be made
 in such a way as to give the appearance of discrimination. This is
 especially so when the constitutional issue is purely a matter between
 the state and its own residents, rather than one in which the state is
 affecting an all-India interest such as inter-state commerce. Most im-
 portant of all, the Court should not make itself a party to such a
 practice even if the President insists on coming to a conclusion on
 these legal questions himself.
 It is no answer to say that the Court cannot be used for political
 purposes since its opinion cannot be known in advance. If a battle is
 essentially political, however real the legal weapons in the battle may
 be, the party with one weapon in its arsenal denied to the other will
 be suspected of using it to its own advantage. The State of Kerala
 61. Times of India, April 7, 1959, p. 6, col. 7.
 62. Times of India, January 1, 1958, p. 1, col. 4 and March 18, 1958, p. 9,
 col. 4.
 63. Times of India, March 18, 1 958, p. 9, col. 4 ; Brief for State of Kerala,
 pp. 18-19.
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 could not get an opinion in the Supreme Court. It had a right to sus-
 pect that the center, in the face of political defeat, tried to win its
 battle in the courts. The suggestion is not the perpetuation of uncon-
 stitutional statutes. Private litigants may challenge the statute at some
 point. But it is necessary to emphasize unwisdom of involving the
 Court in a constitutional question which arises because of political
 tactics not entirely free from suspicion.
 It is not certain what effect this practice will have upon the Court.
 All the anger at unfair treatment could be vented upon the central
 government. However, this practice is a ready breeding ground for
 cynicism as to the Court's impartiality and general aloofness from the
 political arena, not in the sense of the broad social and political aims of
 the people, but in the narrower meaning of particular political factions.
 The specific charge of partiality to the executive is at present unlikely.64
 However, the general charge of involvement with the world of poli-
 tical factions has force. There may be no danger yet; the Court's
 prestige is secure. But that prestige itself rests on a belief that they
 stand beyond party politics. The danger is that the public image
 upon which the Court relies in giving these advisory opinions, may be
 eroded away by the very process of their issuance.
 The position of the Communist state government in the Kerala
 case may be a good sample of future developments; for the real impli-
 cations of the misuse of advisory opinions will become apparent only
 when the monolithic structure of the Congress party begins to crumble.
 As states fall to the control of other parties, the public will become
 more aware of the possibility that the center is not dealing fairly with
 political opponents when a reference is made on issues of great politi-
 cal concern.
 It may be urged that the attempt to avoid these political battles
 is illusory since the government is only going to refer questions of
 great contemporary interest which would, in any event, be raised at
 the first possible occasion by private litigants. First of all, this argu-
 ment has no weight against a charge of unfairness by the center in
 making the reference. Secondly, one can never be too sure in a pre-
 diction of imminent litigation. It is true that the Kerala and Berubari
 64. The original danger of advisory opinions was felt to be the subservience
 which the judges would develop towards the executive based on a lack of tenure and a
 desire to satisfy the questioner with the answer he would most like ; Maitland, Consti -
 tutional History of England (1948) p. 479. The lack of life tenure in India provides
 some basis for the development of such a suspicion among the public, though no such
 attitude is developing at present.
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 cases sprang from heated circumstances likely to give rise to private
 legal battles. But who can be so sure of foreign affairs as to predict
 what Indo-Pakistan relations might have led to in the Berubari case;
 or who' knew for certain what a legislative debate on the Berubari
 cession in advance of the Supreme Court hearing would bring ? And
 in the Kerala case, might not the passage of the unamended Education
 Bill have led to Emergency rule in the State; or might not the Presi-
 dent have refused to give his assent if the Court had denied him an
 opinion ? The point is that you never know for sure in political
 matters whether a legal question will get to the Court. The Court's
 willingness to hear a case despite the political background cannot be
 treated simply as bowing in the face of an inevitable adjudication,
 but a deliberate policy decision that the dangers of a politically
 charged atmosphere are not worth worrying about.
 It is much too early to be certain tňat any trend in the direction
 of politically heated issues is firmly established. Other earlier advisory
 opinions do not seem to have partaken of such a background. The
 issue of delegation of powers in the Delhi Laws Act case arose in a con-
 text which could not cause too much excitement, i.e., theapplication
 of legislation to small areas without their own legislating bodies ;
 though it might have been otherwise if the reference involved social
 welfare legislation. 65 What interest was shown appears to have
 been the result of its being one of the first major decisions
 by the Supreme Court. Of the Federal Court opinions only the
 Central Provinces case generated much excitement.66 World War II and
 the struggle for independence made the other three cases, decided in
 1941, 1943 and 1944, only of secondary public importance.
 The use of advisory opinions since the commencement of the
 1950 Constitution has been confined to questions of public import in
 accordance with the specific requirements of Article 143. But we
 must not suppose that " public import" is synonymous with " political
 volatility." The Delhi Laws Act case amply demonstrates that.
 The responsibility at present for avoiding a reference involving
 heated political controversy must rest largely with the government
 seeking advice. Considering the broad discretion given to the Court
 65. The United States attempt to settle the " delegation " problem involved
 New Deal Welfare legislation ; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 79 L. Ed. 446 (1934) 293
 U.S. 388.
 66. Hindustan Times, June 1, 1938, p 7, col. 2, indicates that the case was of
 great public import, though much of the interest probably arose from its being the
 first case before the new Federal Court.
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 in an advisory opinion, there is no reason why it could not consider
 such factors relevant in deciding whether or not to answer the ques-
 tions posed ; but they do not presently appear to do so. In the Kerala
 case the Court did not evęn note the State of Kerala's objection to
 the reference based on the charge of unfair political tactics by the
 center. Certainly a volatile political background should lead the
 Court to note more carefully whatever factual prematurity may exist,
 such as the flux in the political situation in Berubari and the lack of
 rules in the Kerala case.67
 IV. Arguments in Support of Advisory Opinions
 A. Acceleration of Judicial Review
 A more careful examination is necessary of the specific arguments
 made in favour of advisory opinions as they apply to the Indian context.
 It is frequently said that an advisory opinion save time. The fact which
 leads to this conclusion is the earlier point in time at which a case may
 reach the Supreme Court when an advisory opinion is obtained. But in
 order for an advisory opinion to save time, it must convincingly settle the
 dispute behind the reference. If it does not, more law suits will deve-
 lop and the advisory opinion will have only added to the judicial
 workload. This may occur either because the specific dispute is not
 adequately laid to rest or, even if the dispute is settled, because the
 general proposition of law applied in the case raises future uncertain-
 ties. If the lack of concreteness which comes with premature suits or
 an abstract treatment of a concrete case occurs in a reference to the
 Court, the saving of time may, therefore, be an illusory hope. Indeed,
 it may be seriously questioned whether the Delhi Laws Act case or the
 Hindu Womerfs reference lessened the litigation on the subject matter
 in dispute.68
 Furthermore, the opinion may not generate just the same number
 of private litigations which would have occurred in the absence of a
 reference. It may create doubts and uncertainties which would not
 have arisen or would have otherwise been settled in a non-judicial
 manner. Lastly, the educational value of private litigation in differ-
 ent lower courts prior to a Supreme Court judgment should not
 be underestimated. The various legal positions may be elaborately
 67. See text accompanying footnotes 46-48 concerning the Berubari case and
 fn. 25 regarding the Kerala case.
 68. See fn. 36 concerning the Delhi Laws Act case (general proposition of law
 uncertain) ; and fn. 20 wherein is noted the Umayal Achi case, re-examining the Hindu
 Women's case (specific dispute not settled).
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 explained and developed before the Supreme Court gets the question,
 thereby ultimately leading to a more considered judgment by the
 highest court in the country.
 There is another aspect of saving time besides the conservation of
 time spent in litigation or " judicial time." When a legal decision
 comes much of the time and energy expended in reliance on an as-
 sumption contrary to the law as now revealed is wasted.69 An early
 opinion by the most authoritative court in the land may avoid such
 wastage. Once again, it must be remembered that this benefit comes
 only if the stare decisis effect of the opinion is trustworthy due to a
 mature dispute having been referred.
 The problem of saving non-judicial time has two facets; one is
 the expenditure of time and energy by the government and the other
 involves the private sector. When the government passes a law,
 especially under modern economic conditions, a vast system of ad-
 ministration may come in its wake. If the law is unconstitutional,
 this may all be for naught .N It has been suggested that the Central
 Provinces case afforded a good example of an advisory opinion having
 this salutary effect because of the administrative machinery that
 would have followed this new taxing statute.70 The Delhi Laws Act
 case may also present this situation, for the application of laws to a
 new territory may involve the creation of new administration.
 But the assertion of wastage of time and energy in any given
 case, like all arguments for and against advisory opinions, must be
 examined in the light of the facts of the particular case. First,
 this advantage of a reference does not justify an opinion before a bill
 becomes law. Nor does it justify by-passing the promulgation of
 rules. Care should be taken that there is a real likelihood of admini-
 strative machinery being created in the future. The possible saving of
 time may be a reason for the existence of the institution of advisory
 opinions but it cannot justify its use in every case. It may even be
 possible that a law can be implemented by the use of present adminis-
 trative facilities. No new printed forms may be necessary. Tax
 statutes will probably require new machinery if new taxes are imposed,
 but not if they simply add to the list of assessees.
 Governmental action may proceed beyond the stage of setting up
 administration to the stage of altering the status quo, e.g,. the
 69. "Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statutes 69 Harv . L. RevĒ
 1302, 1313 (1956).
 70. " Executive Consultation of the Judiciary with Special Reference in India "
 Trivandrum Law College Journal, March 1955, Vol. I, p. 17. 22.
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 actual collection of taxes. Here both governmental and private
 time and energy may have to be expended to restore the status quo.
 Once again, the imminence of this possibility is a fact to be shown by
 an adversary debate in the reference itself. Not all governmental
 action alters the status quo. It may even require a maintenance of
 the present situation.71
 There may be a case where the government so alters the status
 quo that the unscrambling is practically or totally impossible. In
 the Berubari case there was fear that the cession of land to Pakistan
 would create an unalterable situation once accomplished. However,
 this is no argument for doing away with the imminence of that altera-
 tion which, in this case, meant a firm judgment by the executive to
 by -pass the consultation of the Parliament and to instruct West Bengal
 to implement the executive decision.
 Injury to the private sector alone may be caused by private
 parties, reliance on some assumption concerning the law. The Hindu
 Women's case presents this problem, for the law in that case purported
 to change property rights. Title and interest in reality would depend
 on the validity of the statute involved.
 All of the above points have been considered under the heading of
 "saving of time", although several different problems have been men-
 tioned. In reality the different problems of false reliances, wastage of
 administrative machinery, and creation of unnecessary litigation are
 all based upon a need for legal decision at an earlier point in time
 than could otherwise be expected. The rationale is the desire not to
 waste human energy. Framing the problem in this light may give us
 a better insight into the significance of advisory opinions in India. It
 is not just the envelopment of the individual by governmental machi-
 nery in the 20th century that urges the speedy resolution of legal
 doubts. It is the importance of time itself. The government cannot
 afford to allow time and money to be spent unscrambling events when
 the country is in urgent need of pushing events ahead as rapidly as
 possible. If a careful appraisal of the genuine risks be made before
 deciding to accept a reference, an advisory opinion may contribute
 to the conservation of the country's resources.
 B. Creation of Judicial Review
 There is another argument which urges the value of advisory
 opinions completely apart from the conservation of time and energy.
 *71. Kerala case, p. 968 ; clause 12 of the impugned statute fixed the teachers in
 their positions by securing tenure, although other sections altered the status quo.
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 This view supports the institution because it may allow judicial review
 where none would otherwise be possible at any time. It is no longer
 a question of accelarating judicial scrutiny, but the existence of it at
 all. This argument assumes that there are cases where an individual's
 rights are infringed but for which there is no relief by the normal pro-
 cess of adjudication. The special utility of advisory opinions may be
 to create a remedy for a violation of legal rights which would other-
 wise go without redress.
 We must first ascertain when legal rights exist but a remedy is
 denied. It is not necessary to open up the whole area of jurispruden-
 tial controversary which surrounds the " no legal right v. legal right
 but no legal remedy " debate. When we say that there is a legal right
 without a remedy we mean only that the reasonable lawyer or layman
 would consider some action illegal or unconstitutional but lacking in
 judicial relief. This concept of illegality or unconstitutionality is
 important because the present argument in favour of advisory opinions
 is based upon the need to vindicate claims of illegal action not nor-
 mally heard in court.
 In at least six situations the Constitution has created legal rights
 for which there is no remedy :
 (1) Articles 131 (Proviso) & 363 - legal disputes arising out of
 treaties with the old Part B princely states or treaties which
 so provide shall not be within the jurisdiction of any
 court ;
 (2) Article 31 (2) - no law shall be called into question in any
 court on the grounds that it provides inadequate compen-
 sation ;
 (3) Article 359 (1) - in the case of a Presidential proclamation
 of emergency an order may be made that the right to move
 any court for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights may
 be suspended ;
 (4) Article 329 - a law relating to the delimitation of consti-
 tuencies and the allotment of seats thereto shall not be
 called into question in any court ;
 (5) Articles 109 (3) & 199 (3) - the decision of the Speaker of
 the House of the People or the State Legislative Assembly
 is final on the issue of whether or not a bill is a Money Bill
 and, therefore, to originate only in the House or Assembly;
 (6) Article 361 - the President, Governor or Rajpramukh is not
 answerable in any court for action purporting to be in the
 exercise of his official duties.
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 The emphasis in all six examples is on the creation of a remedial
 bar to the effective enforcement of a legitimate legal claim. Article
 131 or 363 does not gainsay the existence of a legal right arising from
 a treaty but simply removes such questions from the courts' jurisdic-
 tion; Article 362 specifically guarantees due regard for the rights
 arising out of the agreements with the old princely states. The fact
 that other treaties come within the courts' purview demonstrates that
 such issues are not beyond the general competence of the judiciary.72
 Adequate compensation remains a constitutional requirement under
 the first sentence of Article 31 (2) as interpreted by State of West Bengal
 v. Bela Banerjee ,73 although the last sentence removes the right to go to
 court on this issue. Article 359 suspends the right to move a court
 but does not suggest that the statute or other governmental action
 which cannot be challenged does not violate the Constitution. The
 delimitation of constituencies may clearly involve a violation of the
 Constitution if equal population, as nearly as is practicable, is not -
 achieved in accordance with the requirement of Article 81 (2). And,
 similarly, a Money Bill cannot constitutionally be introduced in the
 upper house,74 even if a non-judicial statement is final on the question
 and the action of a Chief Executive can certainly exceed constitu-
 tional or legal limits even if a court cannot review the transgression.
 These cases may be compared with other situations under the
 Constitution where the courts have been divested of the power to hear
 claims, but where the purpose appears to have been the denial of any
 substantive basis for a claim. The emphasis in all these latter cases is
 on the creation of legislative competence to deal with certain areas,
 rather than on the ouster of the courts from examining a claim of
 legal right. The following are examples where legislative competence
 has been created, i.e. legal rights extinguished :
 (1) Article 19 (2-6) (excluding 19 (6) (i & ii) - reasonable res-
 trictions for the benefit of the public interest, morals and
 order shall not be affected by the freedoms listed in
 Article 19 (1) ;
 (2) Article 19 (6) (i & ii) - statutes for professional and trade
 qualifications and for state monopolies shall not be affected
 by the freedoms listed in Article 19 (1) ;
 72. Article 131 of the Constitution of India gives original jurisdiction to the
 Supreme Court in disputes between governments over treaties to the exclusion only of
 specific types of treaties.
 73. A.I.K. 1954 S.C. 170, 172.
 74. Articles 109(1) and 198(1) of the Constitution of India.
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 (3) Artide 305 - statutes validated by Article 19 (6) (i & ii)
 shall not be affected by Article 301, guaranteeing freedom
 of trade ;
 (4) Article 15 (4) - statutes for backward classes and Scheduled
 Castes and Tribes shall not be affected by this Article or
 Article 29 (2), dealing with discrimination on account of
 caste, race, sex or place of birth ;
 (5) Article 31 A - statutes dealing with certain state economic
 programs shall not be deemed void as against Article 14,
 19 & 31 ;
 (6) Article 122 - no law shall be called into question because
 of any irregularity of procedure in Parliament.
 In all of these examples except number six the Constitution makes
 a judgment that certain types of legislation are valid social objectives
 and are, therefore, not to be illegal. It has, in fact, been said that
 some of the Amendments to the Constitution, which are involved in
 examples 2-5, represented an attempt to clarify the original basic
 intention of the Constitution.75
 Example six, dealing with parliamentary procedures, stands on a
 different footing and illustrates some of the difficulty with our analysis.
 It would have been easy to say that those examples which spoke in
 terms of a loss of procedural remedy were all cases of legal rights lack-
 ing a legal remedy. Indeed, it is still a good guide to that conclusion
 and all the examples we have given of a legal right without a remedy
 do speak in terms of a procedural bar i.e., "suspension of the right
 to move the court", "loss of jurisdiction", and "not call into question
 in any court". However, the example involving legislative procedures,
 which we placed in the "no right" section, also speaks of "not calling
 into question in any court". Thus, while verbal expression is a good
 guide, underlying policy must also be looked to. It appears that legis-
 lative rules are meant only for the convenience of the legislature, much
 as a club may set its own regulations. A violation of such rules does
 not involve an illegal act from the point of view of society, any more
 than a tennis club violates a legal right when it refuses membership
 without a quorum.
 One of the examples of a loss of a procedural remedy may actual-
 ly involve a loss of a legal right. Article 31 (2) prevents adequacy of
 compensation from being examined by a court. Because this provision
 came in with the Amendments to the Constitution which sought to
 75. R. Sharma, The Supreme Court in the Indian Constitution (1959) p. 271.
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 sustain broad state programs of social welfare,76 it may be that legisla-
 tive competence was created rather than a mere removal of a remedy.
 However, unlike Article 31 A, it did not speak of a law not being
 deemed void, an expression which connotes the creation of legislative
 competence. Rather, it spoke of "not calling into question in any
 court" the adequacy of compensation, leaving untouched the clause
 which judicial gloss had read as requiring such remuneration.77
 Furthermore, there is a basis for distinguishing the treatment in
 Article 31 A from 31 (2). Adequacy of compensation is still considered
 a cornerstone of a democratic constitution. Article 31 A may go so
 far as to make constitutional certain state programs which are socia-
 listic. But to legitimize inadequate compensation would be to go far
 beyond socialism. Hence, inadequacy of compensation remains un-
 constitutional, however inadequate the remedy may be.
 It is obvious that one may argue with the categorization of vari-
 ous Articles of the Constitution in the above analysis. What is
 important for our purposes is the acceptance of the need to make such
 categories if we are to understand the argument which supports advi-
 sory opinions because they provide judicial review for otherwise
 neglected legal rights. It is clear that there may be legal questions
 arising out of those examples which involve a total extinction of legal
 rights. For example, one may want to know if a preventive detention
 Act violates Article 19 (1) (d), even if reasonable restrictions upon the
 freedom are constitutionally imposed; or if a statute for backward
 classes violates Article 15 (1) even though Article 15 (4) validates it.
 Similarly, the violation of parliamentary procedures may raise a typi-
 cal legal question even though there are no legal rights vested, in the
 proper observance of the rules. However, such a use of advisory opi-
 nions could not be based upon the argument that the consultative
 function of the Supreme Court provides a forum for the protection of
 legal rights which would not receive attention anywhere else.
 In fact, the use of advisory opinions for legal questions not invol-
 ving legal rights might not even be justified by the Indian Constitu-
 tion. The resolution of this issue depends upon the definition of a
 "question of law" in Article 143, which creates the authority for a
 reference proceeding.
 76. Basu , Shorter Constitution of India (2d. Ed. 1959) p. 131 (quoting Select Com-
 mittee recommendation that the quantum of compensation be for the legislature, not
 the courts). This certainly sounds more like the creation of legislative competence
 than a procedural bar.
 77. See fn. 73.
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 Article 131 of the Constitution sets the limits of the Supreme
 Court's original jurisdiction as a question (whether of law or fact) in
 which the existence of a legal right depends. Though Article 132
 speaks only of a question of law without mentioning legal rights, this
 article deals with appeals from High Court orders which must, of ne-
 cessity, involve legal rights. Thus the pattern of the Constitution in
 using the phrase "question of law" seems confined to those situations
 in which a legal question arises in the context of a legal right.
 Nor can the inclusion of " questions of fact " in Article 143 within
 the range of matters which may be referred to the Court include legal
 questions not relating to legal rights. The kind of "fact "about
 which there can be inquiry must be a fact relevant to those issues
 which arise within the scope of a " question of law ". Otherwise the
 word " fact " will have a wayward meaning which could include any-
 thing and everything.
 Were the use of advisory opinions allowed for legal questions not
 arising in the context of a legal right, we would be likely to encounter
 the dangers of premature intrusion into sensitive political questions.
 Thus to ask if a Preventive Detention Act violates Article 19(l)(d)
 although there is no question of unreasonableness and, therefore, no
 question of the violation of a legal right, is to grapple unnecessarily
 with a crucial issue.78 Likewise, the normal functioning of a legal
 advisor may be displaced as when the parliamentarian's conclusions on
 Lok Sabha rules is disregarded in favour of an advisory opinion. This
 urges an interpretation of "question of law" in Article 143 which
 includes only legal questions relating to legal rights. But, even if a
 broader interpretation be given in the interests of allowing the Court
 discretion, that discretion should normally be exercised to prevent pre-
 mature involvement in questions of law not pertaining to individual
 rights.
 Before we proceed to examine the merits of the argument favour-
 ing the use of advisory opinions to create a judicial remedy for legal
 rights not otherwise protected, we must make sure that the Constitu-
 tion allows such a practice. The language of the Constitution might
 be considered ambiguous. The procedural bars to judicial review in
 the Articles we have noted might exclude even the Supreme Court in
 its advisory capacity. Thus " no jurisdiction " might include a refer-
 ence proceeding and an advisory opinion might be considered to " call
 78. Of course, this legal question did come up in a case where unreasonableness
 was also asserted and, therefore, a legal right allegedly violated ; A. K. Gopalan v*
 1950 S.G. 27.
This content downloaded from 129.79.132.155 on Fri, 28 Jul 2017 18:07:12 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 428 ADVISORY OPINIONS IN INDIA
 into question " that which was forbidden to be judicially heard. How-
 ever, the Constitution nowhere speaks of the advisory "jurisdiction"
 of the Supreme Court ; it is more properly referred to as the consulta-
 tive function to which a term like "jurisdiction " does not apply.79
 Indeed, in the very case where jurisdiction is denied by Article 131,
 the Constitution requires an advisory opinion from the Court (Article
 143(2) ) if the President so requests. Nor can an advisory opinion be
 considered to "call anything into question " in any court, for only the
 advice of the Court is sought.
 A similar analysis is applicable to the other Articles where a pro-
 cedural bar is imposed. The finality of a Speaker's decision is not
 impaired by seeking advice which does not technically detract from
 the finality of that judgment. And the right to move the Court in a
 writ petition which is suspended by Article 359(1) can refer only to
 suits brought in the normal course of litigation ; for advice sought in
 consultation does not move the Court to apply any remedy.
 It is not suggested that the procedures and practices of the normal
 jurisdiction are not to be closely approximated in a reference. Many
 of the dangers of advisory opinions spring from failing to observe the
 rules of prematurity applicable in a normal suit. We refer to the
 historical distinction between advisory opinions and normal proceedings
 as an aid to interpreting the meaning of the sections which forbid a
 judicial hearing. That historical distinction may be validly used to
 interpret an instrument which is the product of history as allowing
 advisory opinions where another type of judicial hearing is denied. At
 the same time we reject that distinction as a good guide for determin-
 ing the practice which the Court should follow in a reference.
 Whatever ambiguity may remain in this matter should be resolved
 in favour of allowing advisory opinions where there is a procedural bar
 to normal litigation. This is more consistent with the flexible and
 discretionary approach of Indian courts in all matters of declaratory
 relief for infringed legal rights. Each case can then be individually
 scrutinized to see if an advisory opinion should be given.
 It remains vital in deciding how this discretion should be exercised
 to discover why the jurisdiction was withheld in the normal adversary
 proceeding. For the reasons for such a withdrawal of jurisdiction do not
 magically slip away because the case arises in a reference. Some light
 79. It is so described in Basu, Shorter Constitution of India (3rd Ed. 1960) p. 300 ;
 and in the title of an article in Trivandrum Law College Journal, March 1955, Vol. I.,
 p. 17 (Consultation of the Judiciary with Special Reference to India).
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 may be shed on this question by examining the instance where no dis-
 cretion is left to the Court to refuse an opinion if requested, although
 all other judicial relief is denied. The fact that the Court lacks dis-
 cretion does not make such an inquiry irrelevant for the government,
 in referring the question, should still be guided by those factors which
 normally preclude judicial review. The reason why Article 131 with-
 holds normal jurisdiction where treaties with the unions of the old
 princely states 80 are concerned is their enormous political significance
 and background.81 The integration of these ancient feudal states in-
 volved every method of persuasion available. No event could arouse
 greater political heat than the absorption of one territory into another.
 However, even with these treaties there may arise disputes which are
 genuinely legal and in which the legal issues are not tools in an essen-
 tially political struggle. Hence the exception in Article 143(2) provid-
 ing for an advisory opinion. The other forbidden area of jurisdiction
 in Article 131 involves treaties which provide that they shall not be
 reviewed in the courts. It may be presumed that the reasoning here is
 also based on a predominance of the political background in which the
 treaty originated. The exception in Article 143(2) remains for those
 disputes which do not partake of this atmosphere.82
 The other areas where courts are deprived of jurisdiction but
 where legal rights persist may be analyzed in the same way. Adequate
 compensation given after the government's exercise of eminent domain
 powers is not justiciable under Article 31(2). The background of this
 amendment to the Constitution suggests that the political branch of the
 government resented interference by the judicial branch in programs
 of social reform.83 As long as the center and the state are of the
 same party, a reference by the center is unlikely to arise in an aura of
 political controversy. However, if the state's social experiment is
 referred to the Court by a politically hostile centre, the reasons for the
 80. Explicit reference to these old princely states in the Constitution was
 removed in 1956 since the abolition of the separate category for the Part B States.
 Treaties with such states are still covered bv Article 131 i Proviso L hnwpvpr
 81. V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States (1961) pp. 292
 493 and passim .
 82. The opinion is made compulsory in thé case of the old princely states in the
 interest of giving them some tangible assurance that they were not totally without
 judicial relief. The compulsion with regard to other treaties whose terms removed
 them from normal adjudication is probably an accident due to their being men-
 tioned in the same paragraph which withholds jurisdiction where treaties with the
 old princely states are concerned (Article 131, Proviso).
 83. See fn. 76.
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 original withdrawal of jurisdiction are as applicable as when a hostile
 private litigaņt challenged social reform legislation.
 Similarly, in the case of a suspension of a remedy for Fundamental
 Rights under Article 359, the policy must be that the events are too
 volatile for a court to interfere due to the emergency prompting the
 suspension. However, there may be cases where the particular indi-
 vidual's Fundamental Right is affected in connection with some law or
 governmental activity unrelated to the emergency although the Presi-
 dent's suspension order forbids all petitions. Such a case could pro-
 perly be referred to the Court though care would have to be taken to
 •assure that there is no appearance of discrimination in favour of those
 who stand to benefit by the advisory opinion.
 The courts are not allowed to examine the delimitation of consti-
 tuencies and the allotment of seats thereto.^ Once again, it is likely
 that the drafters of the Constitution did not want the political passions
 aroused by the issues of representation to be vented in the courts.
 In the case of Money Bills, the policy is not based on the volatile
 nature of the dispute. It is the desire to get a quick decision which
 will be free from interference where any other rule would delay the
 process of legislation. And the protection of the Chief Executive is
 based upon an obvious need to preserve his dignity and prevent
 harassment.
 The discretion to give an advisory opinion and the decision to ask
 for one must be made in the light of these reasons for withholding
 judicial scrutiny in the usual case ; the absence of the factor normally
 precluding review must be the test. Usually this will mean the absence
 of a politically volatile background. But where political heat is not
 the main reason for precluding judicial review, as with the final deci-
 sion of the Speaker on Money Bills and the immunity of the Chief
 Executive, the other considerations outlined above must prevail. If
 this principle is not observed, an advisory opinion will hurl the Court
 into the very difficulties which the Constitution sought to avoid when
 the right to a hearing was taken away. If soundly used, however, an
 advisory opinion may dispel charges of unfairness in those situations
 where the government is most vulnerable i.e., where the alleged un-
 fairness is in an area where judicial reYiew is also precluded.
 V. CONCLUSION
 The basic justifications for the settlement of cases of doubtful
 maturity, discussed in a prior article, are also persuasive arguments in
 favour of the institution of advisory opinions. They are two :* (1) the
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 vital importance of avoiding the wastage of time and energy due to a
 paralysis born of legal uncertainties and to the unscrambling of relianc-
 es based on incorrect legal views ; (2) the inability to trust a private
 or political solution of disputes which may become too volatile.
 There is strong evidence in Article 143 itself that these justifica-
 tions were part of the rationale for the existence of the advisory opinion
 system in India. The provision of Article 143 that questions which
 are " likely to arise " may be referred may indicate some willingness to
 depart frofn the stricter norms of maturity applicable in a regular case
 in the interests of preventing wastage of human energy. And the
 requirement that a question be of public import suggests that some
 political heat may be tolerable in the interests of a judicial settlement
 of an otherwise unmanageable dispute. Both these provisions certainly
 demonstrate that advisory opinions are not meant to be as circums-
 cribed in scope as the normal declaratory judgment.
 Furthermore, the use of advisory opinions to protect rights with-
 drawn from normal judicial examination because of political volatility
 may inevitably involve some commitment by the judiciary to the settle-
 ment of politically charged disputes. While, ideally, only those legal
 rights arising in a non-political atmosphere will be ref erred, the inter-
 ests of averting a charge of unfairness against the government may
 outweigh whatever risks exist.
 Thus, our criticism of the Berubari case may have been too hasty.
 Whatever doubts there may have been about the imminence and
 firmness of the government's decision may be outweighed by the
 irreparability of the harm to the residents of the areas in question,
 the importance to the country of soothing the wound inflicted upon
 West Bengal, and the need to assure the country of the government's
 intention to act legally. The importance of this was heightened by
 the degree of harm to the refugees in the disputed areas who might
 have found themselves back in Pakistan; and the mistrust of a political
 solution due to the widespread dissatif action in West Bengal, a state
 never known for political calm.
 It remains true, however, that each justification for an advisory
 opinion carries its own danger. Anticipation of a dispute may result
 in vagueness and the creation of more doubts than are settled, thus
 causing a greater wastage of time and energy. And, regardless of the
 inadequacy of a non- judicial solution, the courts also have a limited
 capacity to prevent nascent disputes from erupting due to the very
 volatileness which the court hopes to dispel. The withdrawal of pro-
 jection for certain legal rights involving heated political issues from
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 judicial cognizance is evidence that the Indian Parliament shares this
 view in certain cases. Nor will the pressures arising from discontent
 with the Court's conclusions be so easily released when the govern-
 ment does not command a majority capable of amending the Cons-
 titution.
 In the Indian context one over-riding factor makes the dangers
 less serious and the utility of an advisory opinion'greater. That is the
 immense prestige which the opinions of the higher courts carry. The
 predominating willingness to obey the courts' judgments means that
 greater risks may be taken with the goodwill which the judiciary
 possesses. More especially, the Court's role as advisors fits in readily
 with «a traditionally non-litigious society accustomed to resort to the
 opinion of elders rather than to allow a controversy to grow completely
 out of hand.
 It is certainly too early to reach any definite conclusion about the
 functioning of this institution. The Allocation case seemed a harmless
 example of its use ; but, because it brought to the Court a case which
 could have been there under the original jurisdiction,84 none of the
 advantages are illustrated. If this case had allowed the government
 to by-pass lower courts and get a judgment more quickly, time would
 have been saved. Or if it had allowed a declaratory judgment, which
 would not otherwise have been available, a form of judicial scrutiny
 would have been created which might have advantages over actions for
 coercive relief being sought by the government or being awaited from
 the injured party. However, under the Government of India Act,
 1935, the Federal Court could give only declaratory judgments.85
 The problem of abstractness in the extreme form of the Levy case
 does not seem a serious threat at present.86 Since that case, the lack
 of factual development has been the failure to allow history to provide
 those facts which shed light on the proper legal rule, rather than a
 failure to have sufficient facts for an adequate adversary proceeding or
 an understanding of the immediate impact of the relevant legal rule.87
 84. Government of India Act, 1935, sec. 204(l)(a)(i).
 85. Government of India Act, 1935, sec. 204(2).
 86. Hindustan Times, April 26, 1944, p. 3, col. 1 (observations by the judges
 should assure greater consideration by the government in the future on the issue of
 prematurity) ; in fact, no instance of the reference of a question not yet in the stages
 òf a draft bill has recurred.
 87. Delhi Laws Act and Kerala cases -, see paragraphs accompanying footnotes
 26-31 wherein we have labelled this distinction as one between legislative or historical
 and adjudicative facts.
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 The danger recently has been the volatileness of the case, as evid-
 enced by the Kerala and Berubari cases. These cases cannot be defended
 on the rationale that they were creating a judicial review which would
 not otherwise have been forthcoming. Jurisdiction over the subject
 matter was not forbidden the courts nor could it be said that the
 litigants involved were legally inarticulate or unconscious of their legal
 rights.88 These cases are examples of the acceleration of judicial
 review,89 in which the Kerala reference exhibited the dual danger of
 involvement in political controversy and an appearance of political
 discrimination in the use of an advisory opinion.
 Our criticism of the various advisory opinions must not, however,
 be taken as a disapproval of the decision to request or give an opinion.
 We have rather tried to bring out the shortcomings as well as the
 advantages of this institution by examples drawn from the Indian
 experience. In reserve, the institution may serve useful purposes. But
 the justifications for its use must be carefully examined and weighed
 in the context of each case to see if they are really applicable. It rests
 with both the government as questioner and the Court in its capacity
 as guardian of the efficient working of the judicial system to see that
 its use does not become more of a danger to the long-term interests of
 justice than a benefit If the stricture that the institution is good if
 used infrequently is true, there must be some reasons for that being
 so. It is hoped that the analysis in both this article and a prior one
 on prematurity may serve to aid in furthering an examination of those
 reasons.
 88. In the Berubari reference, an attempt had already been made to get a judg-
 ment in the Calcutta High Court ; Nirmal Bose v. Union of MVA.I.R. 1959 Cal. 506.
 And in the Kerala case, the Anglo-Indian, Christian and Muslim communities cannot
 be considered politically or legally unawares.
 89. In the Kerala case, the bill had not yet become law and so was unchallenge-
 able by private parties at this early stage.
 In the Berubari case, the Calcutta High Court had expressed doubt as to the
 maturity of the case (see paragraphs accompanying footnotes 46-48). Furthermore,
 the time necessary for perfecting an appeal to the Supreme Court was avoided by a
 reference (the Calcutta case was reported on April 8, 1959; the reference requested
 on April 7, 1959; and an opinion given less than a year later, on March 14, 1960).
 And lastly, the time needed to bring a new case in the jurisdiction of Delhi where the
 Government of India would be subject to the Court's writ was dispensed with {Nirmal
 Bose v. Union of India A.I.R. 1959 Cal. 506 had held that the Calcutta High Court
 did not have the power to issue a writ against the center in this case, at p. 512).
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 THE NEED FOR RESEARCH IN LAW
 Whether law be looked upon as a pure imperative, deriving its
 authority from the command of some superior, or whether it be viewed
 as a form of "social engineering" that plays a creative role in the
 building of a good society, it is concerned first and foremost with
 human behaviour and human relations in a given social context.
 Many new sciences are now studying this behaviour and these rela-
 tions, and in the light of their findings old legal rules and procedures
 need re-examination. As society changes, so its law must change,
 either in response to the underlying movement or in an attempt to pre-
 vent or canalize the movement. Some parts of the law, particularly
 private law, may endure for centuries with little alteration ; even here
 there is à constant need to rationalize the law, to make it more certain
 and more easily discoverable. Beyond this the fields are increasing in
 which amendments and reforms are required. The judge, lawyer and
 teacher must not only understand and apply the existing law, with its
 daily increment of new statutes, administrative regulations and court
 decisions, but as members of an organized profession they must take
 part in the law-making process by promoting neeeded legal change and
 giving to legislatures from time to time their informed and expert
 opini n
 The law is peculiarly a field in which this need for research should
 be recognized, fo  law is responsive to every new hum n activity and
 embraces the whole of society. The lawyer has always claimed to
 belong to a learned profession. While the life of the law is, as Holmes
 said, not logic but experience, it is learning or scholarship, that records
 that experience, draws lessons from it, and makes them available to the
 practitioner. Without learning there cannot exist those qualities of
 mind which make the great jurists and the leading counsel. Research,
 and learning or scholarship, are inseparable concepts, perhaps not
 capable of differentiation; research involves fact-finding, fact ordering
 and correlating, but does not exclude the thanking about the facts and
 the observation of trends which are more exclusively the role of the
 scholar. The multiplicity of facts in contemporary society, including
 the startling fact, basic to the practising lawyer, that reported cases
 and statutes are increasing at an unconscionable rate each year, makes
 fact-gathering research and legal writing more than even essential to
 orderly progress in the law, and to the validity of the scholarship which
 largely depends on the accuracy of this research. So among lawyers
 we should find the keenest interest in research.
 - ' Report of the Committee on Legal Research ' 34 Curi. Bar
 Rev. 999, 1002-'3.
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